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Abstract
Background: Accurate measures of the severity of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza (pH1N1) are needed to assess the likely
impact of an anticipated resurgence in the autumn in the Northern Hemisphere. Severity has been difficult to measure
because jurisdictions with large numbers of deaths and other severe outcomes have had too many cases to assess the total
number with confidence. Also, detection of severe cases may be more likely, resulting in overestimation of the severity of an
average case. We sought to estimate the probabilities that symptomatic infection would lead to hospitalization, ICU
admission, and death by combining data from multiple sources.
Methods and Findings: We used complementary data from two US cities: Milwaukee attempted to identify cases of
medically attended infection whether or not they required hospitalization, while New York City focused on the identification
of hospitalizations, intensive care admission or mechanical ventilation (hereafter, ICU), and deaths. New York data were used
to estimate numerators for ICU and death, and two sources of data—medically attended cases in Milwaukee or self-reported
influenza-like illness (ILI) in New York—were used to estimate ratios of symptomatic cases to hospitalizations. Combining
these data with estimates of the fraction detected for each level of severity, we estimated the proportion of symptomatic
patients who died (symptomatic case-fatality ratio, sCFR), required ICU (sCIR), and required hospitalization (sCHR), overall
and by age category. Evidence, prior information, and associated uncertainty were analyzed in a Bayesian evidence
synthesis framework. Using medically attended cases and estimates of the proportion of symptomatic cases medically
attended, we estimated an sCFR of 0.048% (95% credible interval [CI] 0.026%–0.096%), sCIR of 0.239% (0.134%–0.458%), and
sCHR of 1.44% (0.83%–2.64%). Using self-reported ILI, we obtained estimates approximately 7–96 lower. sCFR and sCIR
appear to be highest in persons aged 18 y and older, and lowest in children aged 5–17 y. sCHR appears to be lowest in
persons aged 5–17; our data were too sparse to allow us to determine the group in which it was the highest.
Conclusions: These estimates suggest that an autumn–winter pandemic wave of pH1N1 with comparable severity per case
could lead to a number of deaths in the range from considerably below that associated with seasonal influenza to slightly
higher, but with the greatest impact in children aged 0–4 and adults 18–64. These estimates of impact depend on
assumptions about total incidence of infection and would be larger if incidence of symptomatic infection were higher or
shifted toward adults, if viral virulence increased, or if suboptimal treatment resulted from stress on the health care system;
numbers would decrease if the total proportion of the population symptomatically infected were lower than assumed.
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The H1N1 2009 influenza (pH1N1) pandemic has resulted in
over 209,000 laboratory-confirmed cases and over 3,205 deaths
worldwide as of 11 September 2009 (http://www.who.int/csr/
don/2009_09_11/en/index.html, accessed 14 September 2009),
but national and international authorities have acknowledged that
these counts are substantial underestimates, reflecting an inability
to identify, test, confirm, and report many cases, especially mild
cases. Severity of infection may be measured in many ways, the
simplest of which is the case-fatality ratio (CFR), the probability
that an infection causes death. Other measures of severity, which
are most relevant to the burden a pandemic exerts on a health care
system, are the case-hospitalization and case-intensive care ratios
(CHR and CIR, respectively), the probabilities that an infection
leads to hospitalization or intensive care unit (ICU) admission. In
the absence of a widely available and validated serologic test for
infection, it is impossible to estimate these quantities directly, and
in this report we instead focus on the probabilities of fatality,
hospitalization, and ICU admission per symptomatic case; we denote
these ratios sCFR, sCHR, and sCIR respectively.
Although it is difficult to assess these quantities, estimates of
their values and associated uncertainty are important for decision-
making, planning, and response during the progression of this
pandemic. Initially, some national and international pandemic
response plans were tied partly to estimates of the CFR, but such
plans had to be modified in the early weeks of this pandemic, as it
became clear that the CFR could not at that time be reliably
estimated [1]. Costly measures to mitigate the pandemic, such as
the purchase of medical countermeasures and the use of disruptive
social distancing strategies may be acceptable to combat a more
severe pandemic but not to slow a milder one. While past
experience [2] and mathematical models [3–5] suggest that
between 40% and 60% of the population will be infected in a
pandemic with a reproduction number similar to those seen in
previous pandemics, the number of deaths and the burden on the
health care system also depend on the age-specific severity of
infection, which varies by orders of magnitude between pandemics
[6] and even between different waves in the same pandemic [7].
Reports from the Southern Hemisphere suggest that a relatively
small fraction of the population experienced symptomatic pH1N1
infection (7.5% in New Zealand, for example [8]), although these
numbers are considered highly uncertain [8]. On the other hand,
primary care utilization for influenza-like illness (ILI) has been
considerably higher than in recent years [8], and anecdotal reports
in the Southern Hemisphere have indicated that some intensive
care units (ICUs) have been overwhelmed and surgery postponed
due to a heavy burden of pH1N1 cases [9,10].
The problem of estimating severity of pH1N1 infection includes
the problem of estimating how many of the infected individuals in
a given population and time period subsequently develop
symptoms, are medically attended, hospitalized, admitted to
ICU, and die due to infection with the virus. No large jurisdiction
in the world has been able to maintain an accurate count of total
pH1N1 cases once the epidemic grew beyond hundreds of cases,
because the effort required to confirm and count such cases is
proportionate to the size of the exponentially growing epidemic
[11], making it impossible to reliably estimate the frequency of an
event (e.g., death) that occurs on the order of 1 in 1,000 patients or
fewer. As a result, simple comparisons of the number of deaths to
the number of cases suffer from underascertainment of cases
(making the estimated ratio too large), and underascertainment of
deaths due to inability to identify deaths caused by the illness and
due to delays from symptom onset to death (making the estimated
ratio too small) [1]. Imperfect ascertainment of both numerator
and denominator will lead to biased estimates of the CFR.
Estimating the number of persons at these varying levels of severity
therefore depends on estimating the proportion of true cases that
are recognized and reported by existing surveillance systems.
Similar problems affect estimates of key parameters for other
diseases, such as HIV. In HIV, a solution to this problem—which
now forms the basis for the UK’s annual HIV prevalence estimates
published by the Health Protection Agency [12,13]—has been
to synthesize evidence from a variety of sources that together
provide a clearer picture of incidence, prevalence, and diagnosis
probabilities. This synthesis is performed within a Bayesian
framework that allows each piece of evidence, with associated
uncertainties, to be combined into an estimate of the numbers of
greatest interest [14,15].
Here we use a similar framework to synthesize evidence from
two cities in the United States—New York and Milwaukee—
together with estimates of important detection probabilities from
epidemiologic investigations carried out by the US Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and other data from CDC.
We estimate the severity of pH1N1 infection from data from
spring–summer 2009 wave of infections in the United States. The
New York City and Milwaukee health departments pursued
differing surveillance strategies that provided high-quality data
on complementary aspects of pH1N1 infection severity, with
Milwaukee documenting medically attended cases and hospital-
izations, and New York documenting hospitalizations, ICU/
ventilation use, and fatalities. These are the numerators of the
ratios of interest.
The denominator for these ratios is the number of symptomatic
pH1N1 cases in a population, which cannot be assessed directly.
We use two different approaches to estimate this quantity. In the
first (Approach 1), we use self-reported rates of patients seeking
medical attention for ILI from several CDC investigations to
estimate the number of symptomatic cases from the number of
medically attended cases, which are estimated from data from
Milwaukee. In the second (Approach 2), we use self-reported
incidence of ILI in New York City, and making the assumption
that these ILI cases represent the true denominator of symptom-
atic cases, we directly estimate the ratio between hospitalizations,
ICU admissions/mechanical ventilation, and deaths (adjusting for
ascertainment) in New York City. Each of these two methods
provides estimates for the general population, and also for broad
age categories 0–4, 5–17, 18–64, and 65+ years. The result of each
approach is a tiered severity estimate of the pandemic.
Methods
Methods Overview
The overall goal of this study was to estimate, for each
symptomatic pH1N1 case, the probability of hospitalization, ICU
admission or mechanical ventilation, or death, overall and by age
group. The challenge is that in any population large enough to
have a significant number of patients with these severe outcomes,
there is no reliable measure of the number of symptomatic pH1N1
cases. This problem was approached in two ways. Approach 1 was
to view the severity of infection as a ‘‘pyramid’’ [16], with each
successive level representing greater severity; to estimate the ratio
of the top level to the base (symptomatic cases), we estimated the
ratios of each successive level to the one below it (Figure 1, left
side). Thus we broke down (for example) the sCFR (Figure 1,
black), i.e., the probability of death per symptomatic case, into
components for which data were available – the probability of a
case coming to medical attention given symptomatic infection
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medical attention (Milwaukee data); and the probability of dying
given hospitalization (New York data, including a correction for
those who died of pH1N1 but were not hospitalized). Approach 2
wasto use the self-reported incidenceofILIfroma telephonesurvey
in New York City as the estimate of total symptomatic pH1N1
disease, and the total numberof confirmed deathsin NewYork City
as the estimate of the deaths (after accounting for imperfect
ascertainment, in this case due to possibly imperfect viral testing
sensitivity). In each case, prior distributions were used to quantify
information on the probability that cases at each level of severity
were detected; these prior distributions reflected the limited data
available on detection probabilities and associated uncertainty.
All of these estimates were combined within a Bayesian
evidence synthesis framework. This framework permits the
estimation of probabilities for the quantities of interest (the sCFR,
sCIR, and sCHR) and associated uncertainty (expressed as
credible intervals [CIs]). These credible intervals appropriately
reflect the combined uncertainties associated with each of the
inputs to the estimate—mainly, the true numbers of cases at each
level of severity, after accounting for imperfect detection—as well
as the uncertainties due to sampling error (chance).
Study Populations
Data were obtained from enhanced pandemic surveillance efforts
by the City of Milwaukee Health Department and the New York
City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH).
Details of testing policies, data acquisition, and analysis are given in
Text S1. All data were analyzed first in aggregate and then by age
category.
Milwaukee Data
Between April 6 and July 16, 2009, Milwaukee recorded
3,278 confirmed cases and four deaths due to pH1N1, reflecting
sustained efforts to test patients reporting ILI and their household
contacts from the start of the epidemic in April until mid-July. On
April 27, Milwaukee initiated protocols including recommenda-
tions for testing persons with influenza symptoms and travel
history to areas reporting novel H1N1 cases, using a reverse
transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) test specific for
pH1N1. By May 7, Milwaukee issued testing guidance updated to
recommend testing persons with moderate to severe symptoms,
except that testing continued to be recommended for health care
workers with mild, moderate or severe symptoms. We used a line
list dated July 21, and in a preliminary analysis examined the
frequency of hospitalization among cases by ‘‘episode date’’ (the
earliest date in their case report). The proportion of confirmed
cases hospitalized was stable around 3% up to May 20, after which
it increased markedly to 6%–8% in the following weeks. We
judged that this change reflected reduced testing of mild cases and
limited our analysis (used to inform the ratio of hospitalizations to
medically attended cases) to the 763 cases with an episode date up
Figure 1. Diagram of two approaches to estimating the sCFR. Approach 1 used three datasets to estimate successive steps of the severity
pyramid. Approach 2 used self-reported ILI for the denominator, and confirmed deaths for the numerator, both from New York City. Both approaches
used prior distributions, in some cases informed by additional data, to inform the probability of detecting (confirming and reporting) cases at each level
of severity (not shown in the diagram; see Text S1). The Bayesian evidence synthesis framework was used as a formal way to combine information and
uncertainty about each level of severity into a single estimate and associated uncertainty that reflected all of the uncertainty in the inputs.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000207.g001
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source of estimates of ICU admission or death probabilities, we did
employ hospitalized cases up to an episode date of June 14 to
contribute to estimates of the ratio of deaths or ICU admissions to
hospitalizations, since these should not be affected by failure to test
mild cases.
New York Case Data
New York City maintained a policy from April 26 to July 7,
2009 of testing hospitalized patients with ILI according to various
criteria. These criteria evolved up to May 12, from which point
they remained as follows: all hospitalized ILI patients received a
rapid influenza antigen test. Those patients who tested positive on
rapid test (which is known to have low sensitivity for seasonal
influenza [17] and for pH1N1 [18]), and any patient in the ICU or
on a ventilator, regardless of rapid test result, received RT-PCR
tests for pH1N1. We obtained a line list of confirmed or probable
hospitalized cases dated July 7, and found in a preliminary analysis
that all patients in this line list had a date (onset or admission) in
their record no later than June 30, 7 d prior to the date of the line
list. Given that .90% of hospitalizations were reported in New
York within 7 d, we used this entire line list without accounting for
delays in reporting of hospitalizations. Also, given that 98% of
admissions occurred after May 12, we did not attempt to account
for changes in testing practices before May 12. This line list
included a field indicating whether the patient had been admitted
to the ICU or ventilated; patients were not followed up after
admission to determine if this status changed. However, a chart
review of 99 hospitalized cases indicated that none had been
admitted to the ICU after admission, so no effort was made to
account for this limitation.
Separately, we obtained a list of 53 patients whose deaths were
attributed to pH1N1, of whom 44 (83%) had been hospitalized
before dying. All patients with known influenza or unexplained
febrile respiratory illness at the time of death had postmortem
samples and/or samples taken before they died sent for PCR
testing.
New York Telephone Survey Data
To estimate levels of ILI in New York City, DOHMH
conducted 1,006 surveys between May 20 and May 27, 2009,
and 1,010 between June 15 and June 19. Interviews lasted 5 min
and were conducted with households in both English and Spanish.
The survey used a random-digit dialing (RDD) telephone sampling
methodology to obtain data from a random sample of residential
households in New York City. A nonrandom individual from each
selected household was interviewed and provided information
about all household members. Sampled numbers were dialed
between five and 15 times to contact and interview a household, or
until the sampled number was determined to be nonworking.
To account for this design, the data were weighted to the 2007
American Community Survey (ACS); respondents were weighted
to householders by borough, age, gender, and race/ethnicity, and
the population was weighted by age to the borough of residence.
The survey’s RDD sampling methodology gave a useful
overview of ILI in the community, but it has limitations. The
design does not include individuals living in households only
reachable by cellular telephone but not by a landline telephone
number, and it omitted those living in group or institutional
housing. Although households were randomly selected, for the
sake of efficiency the interviewed adult was not. Instead, an
available adult in the household provided information about all
household members and themselves, which may have introduced
bias. The results of the survey are being compiled for publication
elsewhere. Here, we use summaries of these results by age group
(see Text S1) as one means to provide denominators of
symptomatic cases.
Data on Detection Probabilities from CDC Investigations
Sources of data include two community surveys on ILI and
health-seeking behavior, and two field investigations conducted
during early outbreaks of pH1N1 in the US. These sources are
described in further detail elsewhere [19], but are summarized
here briefly. In 2007, the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance
Survey (BRFSS), an RDD telephone survey, included a module on
ILI in nine states. This module included questions to assess the
incidence of ILI, health-seeking behavior, physician diagnosis of
influenza, and treatment of influenza with antiviral medications
during the annual 2006–2007 influenza season. In May 2009,
following the emergence of pH1N1, an RDD telephone survey
sampled similar to the BRFSS was conducted in the same nine
states using only the ILI module from the 2007 BRFSS and limited
demographic questions. In addition, some data were available
from field investigations conducted during large outbreaks of
pH1N1 in one community in Chicago and a university campus in
Delaware. Investigations of these outbreaks consisted of household
interviews in a Chicago neighborhood and an online survey of
students and faculty in Delaware. These data were used to inform
detection probabilities. In addition, these data were used to inform
a prior distribution on the ratio between symptomatic and
medically attended cases, cM|S: these surveys estimated that
between 42% and 58% of symptomatic ILI patients sought
medical attention [19].
Analysis
Estimation of the probabilities of primary interest, cH|S, cI|S,a n d
cD|S, respectively the sCHR, sCIR, and sCFR, was undertaken
using a Bayesian evidence synthesis framework [14]. Details are
given in Text S1, and a schematic illustration of the model is given
in Figure 2. Briefly, in this framework, prior information about the
quantities of interest (including the uncertainty associated with this
prior information) is combined with the information coming from
theobservedcases ateach severitylevel toderive a posteriordistribution
on these quantities. This posterior distribution fully reflects all
information about the quantities of interest that is contained in the
prior distribution and the observed data. Specifically, it was
assumed that detected cases O at each level of severity—medically
attended (M), hospitalized (H), ICU-admitted (I), and fatal (D)—
represented binomially distributed samples from the true number of
cases N at the corresponding level of severity, in the given location
(New York, abbreviated N or Milwaukee, abbreviated W), with
probabilityequal tothe probabilityofdetectionateachlevel(d).The
probability d for each level was informed by evidence on the
probability of testing at each level of severity (which may have
depended on the sensitivity of the rapid test if this was required for
PCR testing) and the sensitivity of the PCR test (Table 1). Thus, for
example, we defined the probability of detecting a hospitalized case
in New York as dHN =d HN1dHN2, where dHN1 was the probability of
performing an RT-PCR–based test and dHN2 was the sensitivity of
that test. Hence, the observed number of hospitalized patients in
NewYork,OHN,was assumed tobedistributed asBinomial(NHN,dHN).
We noted that the ratios cH|S, cI|S, and cD|S can be built up
multiplicatively from simpler components: for instance, the ratio
of deaths to symptomatic infections may be expressed as cD|S =
cD|HcH|McM|S, the product of the ratios of deaths:hospitalizations,
of hospitalizations:medically attended cases, and of medically
attended cases:symptomatic cases. These ratios of increasing
severity are similar to conditional probabilities but are not strictly
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza Severity
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City occurred in persons who were not hospitalized. For this
reason we model deaths separately among hospitalized and
nonhospitalized patients, i.e., cD|S = cD|HcH|McM|S + cD|McM|S.
For each observed level of severity (medically attended, hospital-
ized, ICU, death), the true number of cases was modeled as a
binomial sample from the true number of cases at an appropriate
lower level, hence
NMk*Binomial NSk,cMjS

;
NHk*Binomial NMk,cHjM

;
NIk*Binomial NHk,cIjH

;
NDk*Binomial NHk,cDjH

zBinomial NMk,cDjM

,
where the first subscript indicates severity and the second indicates
Figure 2. Schematic illustration of the relationship between the observed data (rectangles) and the conditional probabilities (blue
circles). The key quantities of interest, sCHR, sCIR, and sCFR, are products of the relevant conditional probabilities. (A) Approach 1, synthesizing data
from New York City and Milwaukee. Note that cM|S (double circle) is informed by prior information [19] rather than observed data. (B) Approach 2,
using data from New York City only, including the telephone survey. Variables: cD|M: the ratio of non-hospitalized deaths to medically-attended cases;
cD|H: the ratio of deaths to hospitalized cases; cI|H: the ratio of cases admitted to intensive care or using mechanical ventilation to hospitalized cases;
cH|M: the ratio of hospitalized cases to medically attended cases; cM|S: the ratio of medically attended cases to symptomatic cases; cD|S: the ratio of
deaths to symptomatic cases; cH|S: the ratio of hospitalized cases to symptomatic cases.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000207.g002
Table 1. Detection probabilities and their prior distributions.
Detection Probability Components Distributions Rationale
dM Medically attended illness dM1 probability of testing, follow-up, and
reporting among medically attended patients
Uniform (0.2,0.35) Data from CDC epi-aids in Delaware and Chicago
[19]
dM = dM1dM2 dM2 PCR test sensitivity Uniform (0.95,1) Assumption [19]
dHW Hospitalization (Milwaukee) dHW1 probability of testing, follow-up, and
reporting among hospitalized patients
Uniform (0.2,0.4) Assumption [19]
dHW = dHW1dHW2 dHW2 PCR test sensitivity Uniform (0.95,1) Assumption [19]
dIW ICU admission (Milwaukee) dIW1 probability of testing, follow-up and
reporting among hospitalized patients
Uniform (0.2,0.4) Assumption [19]
dIW = dIW1dIW2 dIW2 PCR test sensitivity Uniform (0.95,1) Assumption [19]
dDW Deaths (Milwaukee) PCR test sensitivity and other detection Beta (45,5) Assumption [19] (mean 0.9, standard deviation
0.05)
dHW Hospitalization (New York City) dHN1 probability of performing PCR
(rapid A positive or ICU/ventilated)
0.27+0.73
(Uniform (0.2,0.71))
27% of cases were ICU-admitted so received PCR
test; remainder were tested if rapid A positive,
which has a sensitivity of 0.2 [17] to 0.71
(sensitivity among ICU patients in NYC)
dHN = dHN1dHN2 dHN2 PCR test sensitivity Uniform (0.95,1) Assumption [19]
dIN ICU/ventilation (New York City) PCR test sensitivity Uniform (0.95,1) Assumption [19]
dDN Deaths (New York City) PCR test sensitivity and other detection Beta (45,5) Assumption [19]
(mean 0.9, standard deviation 0.05)
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000207.t001
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June 14).
In Approach 1 (New York and Milwaukee data combined), for the
unobserved level of severity (symptomatic cases) we used a prior
distribution of cM|S,Beta(51.5,48.5) to represent uncertainty between
42% and 58% [19]; this distribution has 90% of its mass in this range,
with a mean of 0.515. The main analysis of this first approach was
performed using prior information to inform the detection probabil-
ities. An additional ‘‘naı ¨ve’’ analysis was performed, in which the
detection probabilities dwere set equal to 1 at all levels of severity. Our
prior distributions for the number of symptomatic cases in New York
(overall and by age) were taken as ranging uniformly between zero
and the proportion reporting ILI in the telephone survey (with the
upper bound of that distribution itself having a prior distribution
reflecting the confidence bounds of the survey results; details in Text
S1). For Milwaukee, the prior distribution on symptomatic cases was
taken as uniform between 0 and 25% of the population.
In Approach 2 (New York case data and telephone survey data),
we made the assumption that self-reported ILI cases represented
symptomatic pH1N1 infection, and used the mean and 95%
confidence intervals from that survey to define a prior distribution
on the number of symptomatic cases overall and by age group. We
then used observed hospitalizations, ICU/ventilator use, and
fatalities along with prior distributions on detection probabilities as
above to inform estimates of true numbers of hospitalizations,
ICU/ventilator use, and fatalities, and these in turn were used to
estimate sCHR, sCIR, and sCFR.
The evidence was synthesized through a full probability model
in a Bayesian framework, implemented in the OpenBUGS
software [20], which uses Markov chain Monte Carlo to sample
from the posterior distribution.
Results
Table 2 shows the numbers of medically attended cases,
hospitalizations, ICU admissions, and deaths in the two cities, with
the Milwaukee data separated into the period (to May 20) for
which we believe medically attended cases were consistently
detected, and the period (to June 14) for which we consider only
hospitalized cases, ICU admissions, and deaths.
Approach 1
We considered two alternatives to estimate the ratios of interest
from the combined New York and Milwaukee data, using self-
reported rates of seeking medical attention to establish the
denominator. First, we obtained a naı ¨ve estimate of the ratios of
deaths to hospitalizations, ignoring differences in detection across
levels of severity; and second, we obtained an estimate that
incorporated evidence and expert opinion on the detection
probabilities at each level of severity.
The naı ¨ve estimate would suggest a median (95% CI) ratio of
deaths to hospitalizations (cD|H) of 4.3% (95% CI 3.2%–5.5%), of ICU
admissions to hospitalizations (cI|H) of 25% (95% CI 22%–27%),
and of hospitalizations to medically attended cases (cH|M) of 3.1%
(95% CI 2.0%–4.4%). The ratio of deaths outside of hospitals to
medically attended cases (cD|M) is estimated to be 0.03% (95% CI
0.01%–0.06%). Incorporating the prior evidence that 42%–58% of
symptomatic ILI is medically attended, this would imply a naı ¨ve
estimate of the sCFR (cD|S = cD|HcH|McM|S + cD|McM|S)o f
0.081% (95% CI 0.049%–0.131%), a corresponding estimate of
the sCIR (cI|S = cI|HcH|McM|S) of 0.38% (95% CI 0.24%–0.58%),
and an estimate of the sCHR (cH|S = cH|McM|S) of 1.55% (95% CI
0.98%–2.32%). If one assumes that detection probabilities are no
worse at higher levels of severity than at lower levels, then these
figures would be reasonable upper bounds on the symptomatic CFRs
and CIRs.
Incorporating prior evidence of the detection probabilities at
each level of severity, and thus accommodating structural and
statistical uncertainties in these probabilities, we estimated that
ratio of deaths to hospitalizations (cD|H) of 2.7% (95% CI 1.8%–
3.8%) of ICU admissions to hospitalizations (cI|H) of 17% (95% CI
12%–21%) and of hospitalizations to medically attended cases
(cH|M) of 2.9% (95% CI 1.6%–5.0%). The ratio of deaths outside
of hospitals to medically attended cases (cD|M) is estimated to be
0.02% (95% CI 0.01%–0.04%).
Table 3 shows the estimates for the quantities of primary interest,
overall and by age group, in the analysis that incorporated prior
evidence of detection probabilities. Here, the posterior median
estimate for the sCFR is 0.048% (95% CI 0.026%–0.096%) and for
the sCIR is 0.239% (95% CI 0.134%–0.458%). The sCHR is
estimated as 1.44% (95% CI 0.83%–2.64%).
Table 2. Cases at each level of severity.
Location Age Group Severity
Medically Attended Hospitalized ICU-Admitted Dead
to May 20 to May 20 to Jun 14 to Jun 14 to Jun 14
Milwaukee 0–4 126 (16%) 7 (28%) 27 (18%) 5 (20%) 0
5–17 470 (60%) 6 (24%) 29 (20%) 7 (26%) 2 (50%)
18–64 189 (24%) 12 (48%) 87 (59%) 14 (52%) 2 (50%)
65+ 3 (0.4%) 0 4 (3%) 1 (4%) 0
Total 788 25 147 25 4
New York Age Group Medically Attended Hospitalized ICU-Admitted Dead (total)/Dead but not
hospitalized
0–4 — 225 (23%) 44 (17%) 2 (4%)/2
5–17 — 197 (20%) 51 (20%) 2 (4%)/1
18–64 — 518 (52%) 147 (57%) 46 (87%)/6
65+ — 56 (6%) 15 (6%) 3 (6%)/0
Total — 996 257 53/9
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000207.t002
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by age group, with the lowest severity by each measure in the 5–17
year age group. Comparing the two groups for which we have the
most data, the relative risk of death for a symptomatic 18–64-year-
old compared to a symptomatic 5- to 17-year-old is 15 (95% CI 5–
57). The corresponding relative risks of ICU admission and
hospitalization are 5 (95% CI 2–13) and 5 (95% CI 2–12)
respectively. The Bayesian framework provides a natural way to
estimate confidence (measured as the posterior probability) that
one rate is higher than another. The probability that severity is
higher in the 18- to 64-y age group than in the 5–17 age group is
.99.9%, for each of fatality, ICU admission, and hospitalization
respectively. The data are too sparse to say with confidence
whether adults over 65 or under 65 have greater severity. For
example, among the four age groups, the symptomatic case-fatality
ratio is highest in the 18- to 64-y age group with posterior
probability 62.%, and in those 65 and over with probability 38%.
The symptomatic case-ICU admission ratio is highest in 18- to 64-
year-olds with posterior probability 51% and in those over 65 with
posterior probability 38%. The sCHR is highest in 18- to 64-year-
olds with posterior probability 37% and in those over 65 with
posterior probability 37%.
Approach 2
Table 4 shows the estimates for the sCFR, sCIR, and sCHR, by
age group, when self-reported ILI is used as the denominator
for total symptomatic cases. Overall these estimates are: sCFR
=0.007% (95% CI 0.005%–0.009%), sCIR =0.028% (95% CI
0.022%–0.035%) and sCHR =0.16% (95% CI 0.12%–0.26%).
Compared to Approach 1, these estimates are nearly an order of
magnitude smaller, and the age distribution differs. The relative
risks for each severity in the 18- to 64-year-old group compared to
the 5- to 17-year-old group are 7 (95% CI 3–25) for fatalities, 1.5
(95% CI 0.9–2.5) for ICU admissions, and 1.4 (95% CI 0.9–2.1)
for hospitalizations. The CFR is highest in the 18–64 y group with
posterior probability 52%. In contrast to Approach 1, the CIR is
highest among 0- to 4-year-olds, with posterior probability 79%,
and the CHR is highest among 0- to 4-year-olds, with posterior
probability 99%.
Discussion
We have estimated, using data from two cities on tiered levels of
severity and self-reported rates of seeking medical attention, that
approximately 1.44% of symptomatic pH1N1 patients during the
spring in the US were hospitalized; 0.239% required intensive care
or mechanical ventilation; and 0.048% died. Within the assump-
tions made inourmodel,theseestimates areuncertainupto a factor
of about 2 in either direction, as reflected in the 95% credible
intervals associated with the estimates. These estimates take into
account differences in detection and reporting of cases at different
levels of severity, which we believe, based on some evidence, to be
more complete at higher levels of severity. Without such corrections
for detection and reporting, estimates are approximately two-fold
higher for each level of severity. Using a second approach, which
uses self-reported rates of influenza-like illness in New York City to
estimate symptomatic infections, we have estimated rates approx-
imately an order of magnitude lower, with a symptomatic sCHR of
0.16%, an sCIR of 0.028%, and an sCFR of 0.007%. In both
approaches, the sCFR was highest in adults (in Approach 1, 18–64
y, while Approach 2 cannot distinguish whether it is higher in that
group or in those 65y and older) and lowest in school-aged children
(5–17 y). Data on children 0–4 and adults 65 and older were
relatively sparse, making statements about their ordering more
difficult. Nonetheless, these findings, along with surveillance data on
the age-specific rates of hospitalization and death in this pandemic
(http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/recs/ACIP/downloads/mtg-slides-
oct09/12-2-flu-vac.pdf), indicate that the burden of hospitalization
and mortality in this pandemic falls on younger individuals than in
seasonal influenza [21]. A shift in mortality toward nonelderly
persons has been observed in previous pandemics and the years that
immediately followed them [22].
These estimates are valuable for attempting to project, in
approximate terms, the possible severity of a fall–winter wave of
pH1N1, under the assumption that the virus does not change its
characteristics. In the 1957 and 1968 pandemics, it appears that
perhaps 40%–60% of the population was serologically infected, and
that of those, 40%–60% were symptomatic [2,23–25]. Current
estimates of the transmission of pH1N1 range between about
1.4 and about 2.2, consistent with estimates of the reproduction
numbers from prior pandemics [26–30]. To convert our estimates
into population impacts, one needs to make an assumption about
the attack rate and its age distribution. For each 10% of the US
population symptomatically infected (with the same age distribution
observed in the spring wave), our Approach 1 estimates suggest that
approximately 7,800–29,000 deaths (3–10 per 100,000 population),
40,000–140,000 intensive care admissions (13–46 per 100,000
population), and 250,000–790,000 hospitalizations (170–630 per
100,000 population) will occur. These estimates scale up or down in
Table 3. Posterior median (95% CI) estimates of the sCFR,
sCIR, and sCHR, by age group, based on a combination of data
from New York City and Milwaukee, and survey data on the
frequency of medical attendance for symptomatic cases.
Age sCFR sCIR sCHR
0–4 0.026%
(0.006%–0.092%)
0.321%
(0.133%–0.776%)
2.45%
(1.10%–5.56%)
5–17 0.010%
(0.003%–0.031%)
0.106%
(0.043%–0.244%)
0.61%
(0.27%–1.34%)
18–64 0.159%
(0.066%–0.333%)
0.542%
(0.230%–1.090%)
3.00%
(1.35%–5.92%)
65+ 0.090%
(0.008%–1.471%)
0.327%
(0.035%–4.711%)
1.84%
(0.21%–25.38%)
Total 0.048%
(0.026%–0.096%)
0.239%
(0.134%–0.458%)
1.44%
(0.83%–2.64%)
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000207.t003
Table 4. Posterior median (95% CI) estimates of the sCFR,
sCIR, and sCHR, by age group, using self-reported ILI as the
denominator of symptomatic cases.
Age sCFR sCIR sCHR
0–4 0.004%
(0.001%–0.011%)
0.044%
(0.026%–0.078%)
0.33%
(0.21%–0.63%)
5–17 0.002%
(0.000%–0.004%)
0.019%
(0.013%–0.027%)
0.11%
(0.08%–0.18%)
18–64 0.010%
(0.007%–0.016%)
0.029%
(0.021%–0.040%)
0.15%
(0.11%–0.25%)
65+ 0.010%
(0.003%–0.025%)
0.030%
(0.016%–0.055%)
0.16%
(0.10%–0.30%)
Total 0.007%
(0.005%–0.009%)
0.028%
(0.022%–0.035%)
0.16%
(0.12%–0.26%)
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000207.t004
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if 20% of the population were symptomatic, producing for
example 15,000–58,000 deaths (6–20 per 100,000 population).
Approach 2 suggests much smaller figures (for each 10% of the
population symptomatic) of 1,500–2,700 deaths (0.5–0.9 per
100,000), 6,600–11,000 ICU admissions/uses of mechanical
ventilation (22–35 per 100,000), and 36,000–78,000 hospitaliza-
tions (12–26 per 100,000). Again, these numbers should be scaled
in proportion to the attack rate.
To date, symptomatic attack rates seem to be far lower than 25%
in both the completed Southern Hemisphere winter epidemic and
the autumn epidemic in progress in the US; severe outcomes seem
to be considerably less numerous than those described for Approach
1 with a 25% attack rate. In New Zealand, just under 2% of the
population consulted a general practitioner (GP) for ILI during the
winter wave of the pandemic (http://www.moh.govt.nz/moh.nsf/
indexmh/influenza-a-h1n1-update-138-180809), which is consis-
tent with an attack rate significantly lower than 25%, though
somewhat higher than the GP consultation rate observed in severe
seasonal flu outbreaks such as those in 2003 and 2004 (http://
www.surv.esr.cri.nz/PDF_surveillance/Virology/FluWeekRpt/2004/
FluWeekRpt200444.pdf).
The level ofseverityestimated forthe United States reflects inpart
the availabilityofantiviraltreatmentandothermedicalinterventions
that will not be available in all populations. Oseltamivir use was
common in Milwaukee (Milwaukee Department of Health,
unpublished data), and although the health care system was put
under strain in both cities studied, there was no shortage of intensive
care or other life-saving medical resources. In a situation of greater
stress on the health system, as has been observed in certain locations
in the Southern Hemisphere ([9,10]; http://www.capegateway.gov.
za/eng/your_gov/3576/news/2009/aug/185589), or in areas that
lack a high-quality health care system, severity might increase in
proportion to decreased availability of adequate medical attention.
Worryingly, our estimates of the proportion of symptomatic cases
requiring mechanical ventilation or ICU care was approximately
4–56 our estimate of the sCFR. It is possible that a substantial
proportion of those admitted to ICUs could have died without
intensive care. In populations without widespread access to intensive
care, ourresults suggestthat the sameburden ofdiseasecould leadto
a death rate 4–56higher. Likewise, a change in the virus to become
more virulent or resistant to existing antiviral drugs, or the
emergence of more frequent bacterial coinfections, could increase
the severity of infection compared to that observed so far.
Estimates of severity for an infection such as influenza are
fraught with uncertainties [1]. Our analysis has accounted for
many of these uncertainties, including imperfect detection and
reporting of cases, bias due to delays between events (such as the
delay from illness onset to death), and the statistical uncertainties
associated with limited numbers of cases, hospitalizations, and
deaths. Another major source of difficulty is the spatial and
temporal variation in reporting effort for mild and severe cases; for
example, most jurisdictions in the US stopped reporting mild cases
on or before the second week of May, but this change varied by
jurisdiction. We have attempted to avoid this difficulty by focusing
on individual jurisdictions—New York and Milwaukee—for which
the approach to reporting was relatively stable over time. One
limitation is that Milwaukee changed its guidance during our
surveillance period from testing of all symptomatic cases to testing
of all symptomatic health care workers but only moderate-to-
severe cases in non-health care workers. We believe that testing
policies did not change dramatically during this period, because
the proportion of hospitalized cases remained fairly constant;
however, the sample size before this change in guidance was small.
Thus, our estimates should be seen as being the risk of severe
outcome among persons with symptoms, possibly biased some-
what toward those with more severe symptoms.
Despite our efforts to account for sources of uncertainty, several
others remain and have not been accounted for in our analysis.
First, we have assumed that for each level of severity (from
medically attended up to fatal), case reporting was equal across age
groups; for example, we assumed that medically attended cases
were as likely to be reported for young children as for adults. It is
possible that this is not the case, for example that mild cases were
more likely to come to medical attention if they occurred in
children than if they occurred in adults. If this were true, our
conclusion that severity was higher in adults than children could
be partly a result of differential reporting.
Second, the overall estimates of severity (not stratified by age
group) reflect the age composition of cases in the sample we
studied, especially the age composition of the lowest level of
severity examined, medically attended illness. Among medically
attended cases in Milwaukee, 60% were in the 5–17 y age group,
the one in which severe outcomes were the least likely. A
preponderance of cases within this age group may be typical of the
early part of influenza epidemics, and while it has been argued
that there is a shift from younger to older age groups in seasonal
influenza [31] as the epidemic progresses, there is evidence, at
least from the 1957 pandemic, that attack rates remain higher in
children than adults throughout the course of the epidemic [2].
Since severity of pH1N1 influenza appears to be considerably
higher in adults, a shift in the burden of disease from children to
adults as the epidemic progresses would lead to an increase in
average severity.
We note that the association between age and severity may also
affect observed trends in the characteristics of cases. The World
Health Organization has noted worldwide a shift from younger to
older mean age among confirmed cases (http://www.who.int/csr/
disease/swineflu/notes/h1n1_situation_20090724/en/index.html).
If severity is lowest among children, this upward shift in age
distribution may partially reflect a shift toward detection of more
severe cases, rather than a true shift in the ages of those becoming
infected.
Third, the symptomatic CFR, CIR, and CHR are dependent
upon our estimates of the true number of symptomatic cases, NiSk,
and hence are sensitive to the choice of prior distribution for these,
as well as to our prior assumptions on the detection probabilities.
In particular, if the probability that symptomatic patients seek
medical attention and are confirmed is lower than we assume in
our prior distributions, then there are more cases than are inferred
by our model, and severity is correspondingly lower than our
estimates. If the probability of detecting severe outcomes
(hospitalizations, deaths, ICU) is lower than our prior distributions
reflect, then there are more severe outcomes than our model
infers, so severity is correspondingly higher.
Finally, the small sample sizes in some age groups, the over-65
year olds in particular, lead to large uncertainty in the age-specific
estimates. This level of uncertainty is reflected in the wide 95%
credible intervals for the estimates.
Our two approaches yield estimates that differ by almost an
order of magnitude in the severity of the infection, on each of the
three measures considered. How should planners evaluate these
contrasting estimates? The lower estimates, using the denominator
of self-reported ILI in New York City, may reasonably be
considered lower bounds on the true ratios. ILI is thought to be
relatively rare in May–June, hence true ILI was probably largely
attributable to pH1N1 during this period in New York City.
However, self-reported ILI is notoriously prone to various biases,
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reported rates. A previous telephone survey conducted in New
York City found that 18.5% of New Yorkers reported ILI in the 30
d prior to being surveyed in late March 2003 [32], which
represented a period of above-baseline but declining influenza
activity nationally and no known influenza outbreaks in New York
City [32]. The survey was repeated in October–November 2003,
prior to the appearance of significant influenza activity, and 20.8%
reported ILI in the 30 d prior [32]. If these surveys represent a
baseline level of self-reported ILI in the absence of significant
influenza activity, then the approximately 12% self-reported ILI in
the telephone survey is substantially lower than this out-of-season
baseline, suggesting that it likely overstates the total burden of
symptomatic pH1N1 disease. The lower estimates are also broadly
consistent with estimates from New Zealand, which has experi-
enced a nearly complete influenza season [8], and from Australia
(http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/
cda-surveil-ozflu-flucurr.htm/$FILE/ozflu-no14-2009.pdf). The high-
er estimates, on the other hand, were obtained using ratios of
hospitalizations to confirmed medically attended cases and self-
reported rates of seeking medical attention for ILI, which have been
consistently measured in the range of about 40%–60%. It is possible
that the special efforts of the New York City health department to
identify pH1N1-related fatalities (including those not hospitalized)
provides a fuller picture of the total number of deaths from this
infection. Interestingly, New York City reports about the same
number of hospitalizations for our study period (996) as New
Zealand reports up to mid-August (972), but 3.56as many deaths
(53 versus 16) [8]. If this discrepancy reflects more complete
ascertainment of deaths in New York City, it may account for much
of the difference between our higher estimates of case-fatality ratios
and those from New Zealand. Given the number of uncertainties
cataloged above (which apply also to other jurisdictions within and
outside the US), we believe that our two approaches probably
bracket the reasonable range of severity for the US spring wave.
Age-specific severity patterns as estimated here are largely
consistent with those one would obtain by simply comparing the
incidence of confirmed cases, hospitalizations, and deaths in the
US as a whole for a similar period [19], although the estimates for
persons over age 65 are highly uncertain, with 95% credible
intervals spanning several orders of magnitude, due to the very
small number of individuals in our sample from that age group.
The estimates provided here may be compared to those for
seasonal influenza. Compared to seasonal influenza, these
estimates (assuming a 25% symptomatic attack rate) suggest a
number of deaths in the US that could range from about half the
number estimated for an average year to nearly twice the number
estimated for an average year [33] (Approach 1), or a range about
10-fold lower than that (Approach 2); however, the deaths would
be expected to occur in younger age groups, compared to the
preponderance of deaths in persons over 65 in seasonal influenza.
Such a shift in age distribution is typical for pandemics and the
years that follow them [22]. Under Approach 1, and assuming a
typical pandemic symptomatic attack rate of 25%, the estimated
number of hospitalizations for an autumn–winter pandemic wave
is considerably more than the approximately 300,000 estimated
for typical seasonal influenza [34], whereas Approach 2 suggests a
number between 1/3 and 2/3 of that observed in typical seasonal
influenza. It should be noted that most hospitalizations, and about
90% of deaths attributed to seasonal influenza, are categorized as
respiratory and circulatory, not including the more specific
diagnoses of pneumonia and influenza; that is, they are due to
myocardial infarction, stroke, and other proximate causes, but are
nonetheless likely initially caused by influenza infection [35]. The
deaths included in our study may have reflected more directly
influenza-related causes and may not reflect these indirect causes
of influenza-related death. Indeed, it is unclear whether the
proportion of indirect respiratory and circulatory causes of death
and hospitalization will be as high in this pandemic year, given
the younger ages involved in most severe cases. Given these
differences between the estimates here based on virologically
confirmed deaths and the ecological statistical approach to
estimating influenza-attributable deaths and hospitalizations for
seasonal influenza, it will be difficult to interpret comparisons
between the two types of estimates until (after the pandemic has
finished) comparisons can be made between the ecological and the
confirmed-case approach to estimating burden of hospitalization
and deaths.
Our estimate of the sCFR is lower than those provided by
Garske et al. [16], which ranges from 0.11% to 1.47% overall, and
between 0.59% and 0.78% in the US, but which was based on
confirmed plus probable (rather than symptomatic) cases. Nishiura
et al. [36] estimate that between 0.16% and 4.48% of confirmed
cases in the United States and Canada were fatal. Our Approach 1
includes a probability of approximately 1/8 (,50% probability of
symptomatic patients seeking care 6,28% probability of testing
and report for a symptomatic 6 ,97% test sensitivity, with
associated ranges for each; Table 1) to convert symptomatic into
medically attended cases, and this factor accounts for most of the
difference between our estimates and the earlier estimates based
on confirmed or confirmed plus probable cases. Wilson and Baker
[37], on the other hand, use a denominator of infections (rather
than symptomatic or confirmed cases) and estimate a range of
CFR from 0.0004% up to 0.6%. Our estimates fall in the middle
part of this range. More recently, Baker et al. [8] used their
estimates of the total incidence of symptomatic disease in New
Zealand to estimate an sCFR of 0.005%, equal to the lower end of
the credible interval for our Approach 2 estimate, and consider-
ably below our Approach 1 estimate. The generally downward
trend in the estimates of severity reflects early ascertainment of
more severe cases (e.g., mainly hospitalized cases in the early
Mexican outbreak); the authors of each of these earlier reports
recognized and discussed the issue of ascertainment and its
potential biasing effect on severity estimates.
While we have been careful to highlight uncertainties in the
estimates of severity, our results are sufficiently well-resolved to
have important implications for ongoing pH1N1 pandemic
planning. The estimated severity indicates that a reasonable
expectation for the autumn–winter pandemic wave in the US is a
death toll less than or equal to that which is typical for seasonal
influenza, though possibly with considerably more deaths in
younger persons. If attack rates in the autumn match those of prior
pandemics and hospitalization rates are comparable to our
estimates using Approach 1, the surge of ill individuals and
subsequent burden on hospitals and intensive care units could be
large. However, using Approach 2, estimates of hospitalizations
and ICU admissions are considerably lower. Either set of estimates
places the epidemic within the lowest category of severity
considered in pandemic planning conducted prior to the
appearance of pH1N1 in the United States, which considered
CFRs up to 0.1% (http://www.flu.gov/professional/community/
community_mitigation.pdf).
Continued close monitoring of severity of pandemic (H1N1)
2009 influenza is needed to assess how patterns of hospitalization,
intensive care utilization, and fatality are varying in space and time
and across age groups. Increases in severity might reflect changes
in the host population—for example, infection of persons with
conditions that predispose them to severe outcomes—or changes
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza Severity
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in whom infection is more severe. Changes in severity might also
reflect changes in the virus or variation in the access and quality of
care available to infected persons.
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Background. Every winter, millions of people catch
influenza—a viral infection of the airways—and about half
a million people die as a result. In the US alone, an average of
36,000 people are thought to die from influenza-related
causes every year. These seasonal epidemics occur because
small but frequent changes in the virus mean that an
immune response produced one year provides only partial
protection against influenza the next year. Occasionally,
influenza viruses emerge that are very different and to which
human populations have virtually no immunity. These
viruses can start global epidemics (pandemics) that kill
millions of people. Experts have been warning for some time
that an influenza pandemic is long overdue and in, March
2009, the first cases of influenza caused by a new virus called
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (pH1N1; swine flu) occurred in
Mexico. The virus spread rapidly and on 11 June 2009, the
World Health Organization declared that a global pandemic
of pH1N1 influenza was underway. By the beginning of
November 2009, more than 6,000 people had died from
pH1N1 influenza.
Why Was This Study Done? With the onset of autumn—
drier weather and the return of children to school help the
influenza virus to spread—pH1N1 cases, hospitalizations,
and deaths in the Northern Hemisphere have greatly
increased. Although public-health officials have been
preparing for this resurgence of infection, they cannot be
sure of its impact on human health without knowing more
about the severity of pH1N1 infections. The severity of an
infection can be expressed as a case-fatality ratio (CFR; the
proportion of cases that result in death), as a case-
hospitalization ratio (CHR; the proportion of cases that
result in hospitalization), and as a case-intensive care ratio
(CIR; the proportion of cases that require treatment in an
intensive care unit). Because so many people have been
infected with pH1N1 since it emerged, the numbers of cases
and deaths caused by pH1N1 infection are not known
accurately so these ratios cannot be easily calculated. In this
study, the researchers estimate the severity of pH1N1
influenza in the US between April and July 2009 by
combining data on pH1N1 infections from several sources
using a statistical approach known as Bayesian evidence
synthesis.
What Did the Researchers Do and Find? By using data
on medically attended and hospitalized cases of pH1N1
infection in Milwaukee and information from New York City
on hospitalizations, intensive care use, and deaths, the
researchers estimate that the proportion of US cases with
symptoms that died (the sCFR) during summer 2009 was
0.048%. That is, about 1 in 2,000 people who had symptoms
of pH1N1 infection died. The ‘‘credible interval’’ for this sCFR,
the range of values between which the ‘‘true’’ sCFR is likely
to lie, they report, is 0.026%–0.096% (between 1 in 4,000 and
1 in 1,000 deaths for every symptomatic case). About 1 in
400 symptomatic cases required treatment in intensive care,
they estimate, and about 1 in 70 symptomatic cases required
hospital admission. When the researchers used a different
approach to estimate the total number of symptomatic
cases—based on New Yorkers’ self-reported incidence of
influenza-like-illness from a telephone survey—their
estimates of pH1N1 infection severity were 7- to 9-fold
lower. Finally, they report that the sCFR and the sCIR were
highest in people aged 18 or older and lowest in children
aged 5–17 years.
What Do These Findings Mean? Many uncertainties (for
example, imperfect detection and reporting) can affect
estimates of influenza severity. Even so, the findings of this
study suggest that an autumn–winter pandemic wave of
pH1N1 will have a death toll only slightly higher than or
considerably lower than that caused by seasonal influenza in
an average year, provided pH1N1 continues to behave as it
did during the summer. Similarly, the estimated burden on
hospitals and intensive care facilities ranges from somewhat
higher than in a normal influenza season to considerably
lower. The findings of this study also suggest that, unlike
seasonal influenza, which kills mainly elderly adults, a high
proportion of deaths from pH1N1infection will occur in
nonelderly adults, a shift in age distribution that has been
seen in previous pandemics. With these estimates in hand
and with continued close monitoring of the pandemic,
public-health officials should now be in a better position to
plan effective strategies to deal with the pH1N1 pandemic.
Additional Information. Please access these Web sites via
the online version of this summary at http://dx.doi.org/10.
1371/journal.pmed.1000207.
N The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
provides information about influenza for patients and
professionals, including specific information on pandemic
H1N1 (2009) influenza
N Flu.gov, a US government Web site, provides access to
information on H1N1, avian and pandemic influenza
N The World Health Organization provides information on
seasonal influenza and has detailed information on
pandemic H1N1 (2009) influenza (in several languages)
N The UK Health Protection Agency provides information on
pandemic influenza and on pandemic H1N1 (2009) influenza
N More information for patients about H1N1 influenza is
available through Choices, an information resource pro-
vided by the UK National Health Service
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